Development as Freedom provide an opportunity to assess his intellectual contribution and style. The paper identifies entitlements analysis and capabilities analysis as the areas which make him stand out for wider audiences from the economists of his generation; and considers the integrative development philosophy which he has constructed around those two areas, centering on the direct and instrumental values of freedom and democracy. Three aspects of Sen's intellectual style are discussed: first, his multi-disciplinarity and fruitful balance between vivid cases, formal theorizing, and policy relevance; second, a preference for gentle persuasion, seen in adoption of evocative but ambiguous, politically safe labels and an avoidance of seeking debate on all fronts (e.g. concerning hyper affluence); third, a continuing project to debate with and influence economists, and hence, while upgrading parts of their inadequate picture of persons, retention of other parts. His capability approach lends itself however to enrichment by deeper analyses of human agency.
philosophy that is both more rigorous and more policy-relevant, as well as less narrowly Euro-American in assumptions and concerns; and thus, whether seen as a distinct field for discussion or not, towards development ethics that can help guide development policy and practice. I will outline--briefly, non-exhaustively, and with a broad brush--some of his contributions of major interest to development studies, with special reference to normative analysis, and will suggest significant features of Sen's intellectual project and style. The synthesis of his views on socio-economic development in his new book Development as Freedom receives special attention.
ENTITLEMENTS ANALYSIS AND CAPABILITY ANALYSIS
Amartya Sen (b. 1933) was already an internationally reputed economist 25 years ago, known for his work on, amongst other areas, the cost-benefit analysis of public investments, growth theory, and the relationship between choices for a collective and the preferences of its members. He has continued prominent in chosen fields in technical economics. What makes him most stand out for wider audiences however, amongst and from the economists of his generation, is his work in the past quarter century in two major, linked, areas:
(1) the analysis and explanation of famine, and of hunger and poverty more generally, notably through his 'entitlements approach'; together with formulation and use of a resulting framework for policy responses; and (2) going beyond critique of welfare economics (the concepts and theories in economics about when we can say that people and societies are better placed) to offer a reconstruction: including his 'capability approach' and the associated reconceptualizations of well-being, poverty, equity, and development. 1 This work provides broader perspectives on, respectively, (1) claims and allocations, now perceived as within a society and polity, not only an economy, and (2) personhood and well-being.
In both areas Sen presented the main features of this thinking in the late 1970s and early 80s. He could have received the Nobel Prize at any time in the past decade, but the economics prize panel of the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences was reportedly dominated by neo-liberal market economists and methodological conservatives. In the interim Sen added much and, probably more important, has effectively inspired, often even directly fostered, a considerable body of work by others. His ideas around poverty, opportunity, equity, and quality of life have become increasingly influential in economics and development studies (with 'development' here as a concept of global scope, not only for poorer countries). His deep, structured, thinking about questions of major theoretical and policy relevance, plus an exemplary style of communication, in writing and in person--clear, courteous, persistent, assiduous, dialogical--have gradually mobilized a substantial network of researchers and practitioners who now partly work and think along lines formed by Sen.
Entitlements analysis
Of the two major areas mentioned above, Sen's 'entitlements approach' to the analysis of famine, and hunger and poverty more generally, has become relatively widely known. His book on Poverty and Famines (1981) presented a socially disaggregated analysis of absolute poverty. Just as the poverty of some does not imply an overall shortage of satisfiers, so in the extreme case the starvation of some does not imply an overall shortage of food, but rather those people's shortage of convertible claims, entitlements, acquisition power. Many factors, including people's political and civil rights, become seen clearly as influences on this acquisition power. Entitlements analysis was consolidated in a three-volume study on famine and hunger for the U.N. Hunger (1990) , edited with Jean Drèze. Sen also extended his disaggregation into the household.
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Sen has used the entitlements approach as a framework for thinking broadly about policy alternatives to prevent and reduce deprivation. The framework, including a strong stress on varied forms of 'public action' besides direct state action, is seen in his books with Drèze on Hunger and Public Action (1989) and on the backwardness of social development in India (Drèze & Sen, 1995) . Their public action perspective has become widely influential, well beyond academe. This is notwithstanding, and even in part because of, ambiguities in Sen's term 'entitlement', which have led to divergence by many others from his usages despite believing that they are following them. I have elsewhere analysed (Gasper, 1993 ) the approach's appealing but sometimes enigmatic terms, and its achievement still in providing a helpful framework in problem analysis and policy analysis for famines and poverty. This pattern--use of attractive, ambiguous, yet in context still helpful terms--is seen also in capability analysis and will be returned to later in regard to Sen's overall approach.
Capability analysis
The second major area, Sen's critique and extensions of welfare economics, has so far probably been more directly discussed and used in development ethics, -He has extensively drawn in ideas from philosophy, and re-established the close links necessary between ethics and economics (summarized in a luminous set of lectures: Sen, 1987) . Simultaneously, he has notably strengthened philosophers' analyses of well-being and equity; and thus, most unusually in modern days, was both Professor of Philosophy and Professor of Economics at Harvard.
-He has reconceptualized equity and equality, making us always ask 'equality of what?' and understand each version of equity as involving equality of something.
-Highlighting two particular categories of additional information, his 'capability approach' leads us to look at the range of life-options that people have (their 'capability set'), and the actual things they do and achieve (their 'functionings'), not only at their incomes or their imputed ('she chose it, so it must make her happy') or declared state of satisfaction, each of which can be misleading.
-His reconceptualization of poverty and development in these terms helps us see the range of relevant dimensions, see poverty as in some respects relative and in other respects absolute, and in particular consider development as involving the extension of the set of attainable and worthwhile life-options that people have --the notion adopted in the 1990s by UNDP and its annual Human Development Reports, thanks to the late Mahbub Ul-Haq.
'DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM'
Sen's new book goes further. His earlier broadening and enrichment of welfare economics (Sen, 1970 (Sen, , 1982 (Sen, , 1984 , and widening of vision in policy economics (Sen, 1981; Drèze & Sen, 1989) , have been synthesized with a range of ideas from his explorations in social philosophy, to present a lucid, integrated perspective on development. Ideas from the earlier work-such as that entitlements are socially defined; that democracies have (almost) no famines; that there are many forms of public action besides State intervention and provision--are knitted together within an overall approach to political economy and public affairs. One chapter, for example, compares and relates Sen's freedom language to international human rights language.
Very evident is this more emphatic, explicit and central use of the language of 'freedom', as in the book's title. People want freedom; and their intelligence as well as their wilfulness imply that such freedom is essential in formulating informed and widely accepted statements of purposes and priorities, and should be a principal instrument for pursuing the purposes. Sen elucidates three major roles of freedom and democracy.
First, freedom and democracy have direct importance, being valuable in themselves. Sen asserts that all available evidence shows that very poor people too place significant value on freedom.
2 He now emphasises an argument long standard in politics and philosophy but less familiar in economics: that part of the desirability of markets is insofar as they form arenas for exercise of free choice, irrespective of their results, which may add to or detract from this distinct source of attraction.
Secondly, freedom has instrumental importance, as often conducing to the attainment of other desired ends. The chapter on population argues, for example, that free discussion in South India has led to sharper (and sustained) declines in female fertility than have been achieved by compulsion in China (pp.222-3); and that.
women's education and employment are a far better 'contraceptive' than is economic growth. 3 The chapter on women's agency argues that women's independence, as measured by outside employment, literacy and education, is far more significant in 2 Sen (1999) , pp. 224-5. He relies heavily here on one case: the shift of some percentage points in Indian voters' choices in 1977, away from Indira Gandhi's Congress Party, at the end of her period of emergency rule with its cases of forcible sterilization and shanty town clearance. 3 For possibly reverse findings on fertility decline in China, see Feng (1999) .
reducing infant and child mortality and anti-girl bias than are general economic and social development (including growth of production, urbanization, and access to health facilities). Free discussion and circulation of information, followed by democratic decision-making, are presented as potent also in overcoming Pareto's paradox: that a measure that benefits one powerful person a thousand (or five hundred) francs, at the expense of a one franc loss to each of a thousand poorer persons, is very likely to be established and maintained, because the gainer has high motivation to mobilize forces to do so. The centrality proferred to democracy is a bold generalization from Sen's earlier theses that there has never been a famine in a democracy and that the Chinese Great Leap Forward brought the greatest famine in history (Sen, 1981; Drèze & Sen, 1989) . Democracy provides both for free circulation and testing of vital information, and for incentives to decision-makers to anticipate or respond to the informed 4 The orthodox response may be to say that whatever one's objectives one can fulfil them more by gaining more money, so policy must remain focused on financial calculations. This implicitly recognises that how one uses money, say to promote valued capabilities and functionings, will require analysis beyond orthodox economics. Insofar as money dominance is found in various ways to undermine social relations, personal balance and quality of life then the critique goes much further, into territories very compatible with capabilities (sic) analysis but not ones highlighed by Sen, as we will see.
pressures from their electorate. 5 Intense consideration of such cases has helped Sen to engage readers and to build theory, including through forming new categories or formalising everyday ones missing from economics and previously unformalised in philosophy, such as entitlements and capabilities.
Sen often finds or already has empirical counterparts for his notional cases: he moves to 'thin' theorizing about selected aspects after first thinking on real cases; or begins thin, with a hypothetical case, but then seeks to confirm its relevance through examining real counterparts and checking that he has not left out key features. The approach typically remains a components/factors analysis, rather than holistic. That can be acceptable because his style of theorizing typically leads to procedural advice not policy edicts: 'pay attention also to factors A and B', not 'conclude and do as follows'. And it is characteristically embellished or, rather, reconnected to richer, real life, by anecdote and quotation. His third-stage work of policy analysis and general advice--such as in Hunger and Public Action and for the Human Development
Reports and human development indices--is thus conducted without forgetting the corrigibility and incompleteness of his theorization.
Overall, his ability to link cases, concepts, explanatory and normative theory and policy analysis gives his work the character of a research programme and has mobilized the attention and cooperation of a variety of others. The programme is to build a more humane, deeper, real alternative to the dominant liberal-utilitarian welfare economics; not as a single grand model, but as a flexible approach that can more satisfactorily handle rich and varied human situations.
SEN'S APPROACH -II: COSTS AND BENEFITS OF GENTLE PERSUASION
Sen defines development as 'a process of expanding the real freedoms that people enjoy'; 'a process of removing unfreedoms and of extending the substantive freedoms of different types that people have reason to value ' (1999, pp. 3, 86) . If development is process rather than outcome, should not his book's title be 'Development as Liberation' rather than 'Development as Freedom'? 'Liberation' however conveys something different from 'Freedom', especially in America. Perhaps Sen would prefer the clumsier 'Freedom-Expansion' over 'Liberation' as a description of process, but not adopt it for a title. The choice of the imprecise but attractive and politically safe term 'Freedom' illustrates a sustained style: cautious boldness, seeking a wide, mainstream audience with terms, tones and topics that will appeal and engage them.
Topics omitted in 'Development as Freedom' reflect this caution. In taking welfare economics beyond analytical fetishization of the commodity--'the focus has to be…on the freedoms generated by commodities, rather than on the commodities seen on their own' (1999, p.74)--Sen shows the human capital approach to be seriously incomplete. It ignores values other than the growth of production and it reduces the concept of production to commodity production, things handled by markets. But Sen does not engage with the behavioural realities of commodity fetishism, commodity superfluity and addiction, and other unfreedoms and side-effects generated by wealth and commodities. While he rejects the path of Arthur Lewis and mainstream economics--concentration on growth of commodity production on the assumption that this increases freedom--he does so only because the growth of freedom 'depends also on many other factors'. When he grants that 'Certainly, other things given, an increase in output and income would expand the range of human choice--particularly over commodities purchased ' (1999, p.290) , he sidelines how the acquisition of commodities can sometimes be at the cost of much human freedom.
Other references in his work suggest that Sen is aware of deeper issues here, but that due to his focus on countries like India and on audiences which include those in or close to power, he chooses not to highlight them. When we consider terms, both Sen's major coinings, 'entitlements' and 'capability' have wide appeal. They carry some sense of worth and of real people's lives. Both however diverge from the previous usages which nourish them, in directions chosen to persuade economists to join the discussion. 'Entitlement' means an actual title to goods, or a normative claim to title. As used by Sen it becomes the set of all those goods vectors to which one could acquire title. 10 'Capability' means 'a feature or faculty capable of development' or an ability or power. Sen builds rather on its other meanings, 'potential for an indicated use' and.'the quality or state of being capable' (Webster's Dictionary). For him, one's capability (set) is the set of all those functionings vectors which one could attain. Yet he retains the term 'capabilities' too, when referring to the attainability of particular functionings; for it seems to have more appeal and better grounding in ordinary language and an understanding of people as 9 A more persuasive argument is that the relative effectiveness of authoritarian governments in East Asian NICs partly reflected the pressures, actual and potential, they felt from opposition forces (Sen, 1999, p.156) . The comparative ineffectiveness of governments in India in social development programs he relates to 'docility of opposition' (loc. cit.), which he does not link to class interests.
learners who evolve. The distinct and more refined and psychologically probing version of capabilities theory created by Sen's one-time collaborator, the philosopher Martha Nussbaum, correspondingly distinguishes between, first, people's potentials for acquiring capacities, second, their actual capacities and skills, and third, Sen's sense, their access to possible ways of living. In capabilities theory as in entitlements theory, Sen's chosen combination of concept and label has however performed the feat--even if at some cost in clarity--of stimulating economists to think more realistically about people.
In an earlier paper (Gasper, 1997) I have assessed Nussbaum's and Sen's contrasting versions of capabilities theory, in relation to each other and to the agendas and questions each has selected. The differences in part reflect choices of audience, with Sen oriented relatively more to economists and analytic philosophers (where he indeed achieves impact in both groups), Nussbaum more to humanities. At the same time, to spread and strengthen the capability approach and create a broader development ethic that is persuasive to wider ranges of people would require more adequate pictures of 'culture' and 'the individual' than Sen and even Nussbaum have used, and a combination of insights from communitarian and other critics together with those in the capabilities approach (Gasper, 1997: 281, 299) . The papers by Giri and Carmen in the present Policy Arena are steps in that direction.
SEN'S APPROACH -III: OF PEOPLE AND ECONOMISTS
Sen proceeds as an economist, an exceptional trans-disciplinary one, but one who has not turned his back on his discipline for its failings. He tries instead to reform it. This continuing orientation to disciplinary economics audiences in the core of his work carries a price in the type of questions and methods he engages with. I have argued elsewhere that it restricts Sen's version of capabilities analysis and limits its appeal amongst many non-economists; but also that no one set of frames can serve for all purposes and audiences. Sen's frames serve well for some (Gasper, 1997) .
Sen does move a great way beyond a conventional economics conception of people as asocial atoms of selfishness. First, he identifies and stresses agency aspects 10 Sen himself returns to the first usage when speaking of 'the economic entitlements that economic agents are practically able to secure ' (1999, p.39 hence for example his faith in freedom as the reliable path to fertility reduction.
Possible criticisms of Sen's conception of people can be stated as a series of over and under-emphases: too much on people as choosers, rather than as actors in a fuller sense; too little on skills and on functionings, compared to opportunities; too little on meanings, and in fact too much on freedom. Let us consider these in turn. I will suggest there is some but limited truth in each criticism. On examination we find much relevant qualification and elaboration already in Sen; and that the capability approach lends itself to enrichment from work with deeper analyses of agency (for example, by Carmen and Giri in this set of papers). There seems no incompatibility.
The skills of valuing, choosing, operating and co-operating
The capabilities approach to development stresses range of choice. In principle this is only for choices between options which one 'has reason to value', a phrase Sen often employs. In some formulations and practice by others the principle degrades to:
'more choice is good', automatically--including ever more brands, more options for futile over-consumption. The same pattern is seen in consumer theory in economics, and involves neglect of the content and skills of 'having reason to value'. individuals.
Yet when Sen lists sources of variation of well-being between persons, other than real incomes, the examples he gives for relevant personal heterogeneities are physical, concerning health variables and physical location, and inborn talents (1999, pp.70-1, 80, 88-90) . Other sources mentioned include social location and social environment. Not mentioned are the personal but learned skills of reasoning and acting. Mention of 'social capital' and of the demoralizing effects of unemployment are the nearest we get. He refers often to the extraordinarily high mortality and morbidity of Afro-Americans relative to their real incomes --a case in which skills and morale are likely implicated, not only social location and environment. Sen's treatment of skills of reasoning, valuing, operating and co-operating seems to remain relatively thin (Andersson, 1996) . Gaps between opportunity and action, and choosing and doing, while not ignored have not been deeply investigated. Hence the dissatisfactions expressed by Giri and Carmen, amongst others.
Freedoms, achievements and meanings
Culture concerns meanings and values as well as skills. Sen's chapter on culture looks critically at asserted inter-civilizational ('East' versus 'West') differences, rather than at meaning-relativity more generally. His recurrent example of the difference between fasting and starving highlights that the meaning of not taking food depends on whether one has an alternative: fasting means one has (Case 1), starving means that one has not (Case 2). But he goes beyond defining fasts, to
propose that the fasting person is better-off: she has more options; she could eat but does not. Yet in principle, a starving person might turn his/her starvation into a sort of protest fast-to-death, let us say in front of some bastion of authority or privilege: she then would not eat even if she could (Case 3; Gasper, 1997 Gasper, 1996 Gasper, & 1997 In assessing a person's situation Sen gives priority to capability, potential functionings, above achieved functionings. Sometimes he writes as if capability is the sole criterion, implying an overwhelming value placed on choice or a high presumption of sufficient skills. The definition of development can become: more choice. No other aspects of life are specified, rather they are left for: choice. Does Sen overstate the relative priority of capability, and freedom, compared to functioning?
13
Just as 'Development as Freedom' does not discuss when growth becomes imprisoning, it never considers when choice can become oppressive. It would be unfortunate if, having begun in the 1960s by insisting on the need for welfare economics to attend to many more types of information, Sen's recent efforts at synthesis and dissemination contributed to a reductive emphasis on choice alone. 13 In practice, capabilities have usually to be imputed from observed functionings, which lessens this issue of value priority. It may also explain why the two terms often seem interchangeable, even for Sen (e.g. longevity can be presented as a capability, and functionings specified as 'what a person is actually able to do '; 1999, pp.43, 75, my emphasis) . But it returns us to the other issue: observed functionings are only a good proxy for capability if people can be assumed to have the skills, knowledge and attitudes to perceive and take their best (or at least a steady proportion of their) opportunities.
A choice-centred but meaning-thin perspective is typical of modern economics and one strand in modernity. 14 Its limits and dangers are considerable. On the other hand, by retaining in substantial part the language and assumptions of orthodox economics, such as its picture of calculating individuals, Sen has been able to influence economics in particular areas, notably its discourses of welfare and policy.
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The potential prize is great: influence upon a key target group, mainstream economists and those using such a worldview. If Sen had adopted a quite different picture of persons and agency, he might have acquired (even) more non-economist admirers, but he would have lost most of his audience within economics and thus his most important line for influence.
The conversation between economists and philosophers, to which he has especially contributed, is inevitably different from the conversation between, for example, cultural anthropologists and philosophers. But development studies needs many lines of conversation; and it needs the ones pursued so well by Amartya Sen.
